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NOTES
IN BONDS WE TRUSTEE:
A NEW CONTRACTUAL MECHANISM TO
IMPROVE SOVEREIGN BOND RESTRUCTURINGS
Robert Auray*
Governments around the world raise significant amounts of capital by
issuing sovereign bonds in international financial markets. These bonds
are typically purchased and traded by foreign investors who seek a
profitable return on their investment. The issuing country incurs sovereign
debt, which it must repay over a predetermined period of time.
Occasionally, sovereigns—typically emerging market governments—
become unable or unwilling to repay their sovereign debt.
A country’s ability to repay its debt is difficult to assess given the
multitude of nonfinancial factors that affect the assessment. As a result,
investors are vulnerable to opportunistic defaults which can deprive them
of their investment. Additionally, investors cannot collect on their
investment through bankruptcy proceedings because a country cannot
declare bankruptcy. The financial markets have responded to this
challenge with a variety of contractual mechanisms aimed at facilitating a
debt restructuring, which will simultaneously lower the sovereign’s debt
burden while ensuring that investors receive payment on their investment.
Unfortunately, the contractual mechanisms currently utilized in sovereign
bond contracts have proven to be inadequate.
This Note begins by explaining sovereign debt and the major problems
with the current international sovereign bond market. Next, this Note
explores the global community’s various efforts to address these problems
thus far and explains why these solutions have proven inadequate.
Ultimately, this Note proposes a new contractual mechanism that provides
for the creation and use of a new type of trustee to monitor, enforce, and
renegotiate sovereign bonds.
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INTRODUCTION
On October 2, 2012, NML Capital, a U.S. hedge fund, was granted an
injunction from the Ghanaian Commercial Court to prevent a 103-meterlong Argentine naval vessel—the ARA Libertad—and its crew from
leaving the Ghanaian port of Tema.1 NML Capital is a subsidiary of Elliott
1. See Drew Benson, Bond Vigilantes’ Ghana Ambush Proves Default Hex Unbroken,
BLOOMBERG NEWS (Oct. 4, 2012, 5:07 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-1004/bond-vigilantes-ghana-trap-shows-default-hex-argentina-credit.html; see also Seized Ship
Crew Back in Argentina from Ghana, BBC NEWS (Oct. 25, 2012, 3:50 PM),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-20078320.
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Associates—a U.S. hedge fund that owns Argentine debt worth 1.6 billion
U.S. dollars (USD), dating back to Argentina’s 2001 default.2 Argentina’s
triple-mast frigate represents a mere fraction of the total amount Elliott
seeks to collect from Argentina.3
Elliott has been aggressively pressing Argentina to pay the full value of
the sovereign bonds that Elliott has held since Argentina defaulted on its
bonds in 2001 and subsequently issued exchange offerings in 2005 and
2010.4 At those times, roughly 94 percent of the bonds at issue were
exchanged.5 The restructurings offered bondholders an exchange at
approximately thirty cents on the dollar, a 70 percent loss on their
investment.6
Unfortunately for Elliott, a United Nations court—the International
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea—ordered Ghana to release the Libertad on
December 15, 2012.7 While Argentina appears to be victorious on this
front, it faces a more costly battle in the Second Circuit.8 In October 2012,
the Second Circuit ruled that should Argentina make payments to creditors
who participated in the 2005 and 2010 bond exchanges, and it must pay
NML Capital and other similarly situated holdout creditors as well, up to
the full accelerated principle and interest on the defaulted bonds: USD 1
billion.9
The ongoing struggle between a hedge fund and a sovereign nation is
illustrative of the chaotic process countries typically encounter when they
restructure their sovereign bonds. This Note suggests a new contractual
mechanism that should be included in sovereign bond contracts that will
bring order to the tumultuous restructuring process. Part I of this Note
provides background information about debt, sovereign bonds, and the
major problems with the current restructurings system. Next, Part II
explores the failures of the current contractual mechanisms. Finally, Part
2. See Benson, supra note 1; Argy-Bargy, ECONOMIST, Dec. 1, 2012, at 80, available at
http://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21567386-argy-bargy.
3. See Benson, supra note 1; Seized Ship Crew Back in Argentina from Ghana, supra
note 1 (“The fund, NML Capital, argued it was owed [USD 370 million] as a result of
Argentina’s debt default a decade ago. It is seeking [USD 20 million] in return for the
release of the ship, a three-masted training vessel.”).
4. See Benson, supra note 1; see also infra notes 159–84, and accompanying text.
5. See Benson, supra note 1; see also infra notes 304–13, and accompanying text.
6. See Benson, supra note 1; Seized Ship Crew Back in Argentina from Ghana, supra
note 1.
7. See Jude Webber & Xan Rice, UN Tells Ghana To Release Argentine Ship, FIN.
TIMES (Dec. 15, 2012), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/f9b1dd84-46db-11e2-8b2f00144feab49a.html#axzz2GSgDetmR.
8. See generally NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Arg., Nos. 12-4694, 12-4865, 2013
WL 4487563 (2d Cir. Aug. 23, 2013); see also Jude Webber & Robin Wigglesworth,
Bondholders Add Twist to Argentine Debt Spat, FIN. TIMES (Dec. 28, 2012),
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/181ccd5c-50c2-11e2-9623-00144feab49a.html
#axzz2HQpX9ZKy; Webber & Rice, supra note 7.
9. See NML Capital, 2013 WL 4487563, at *11; NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of
Arg., 699 F.3d 246, 263 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. denied, No. 12-1494, 2013 WL 3211846 (U.S.
Oct. 7, 2013); see also Anna Gelpern, Pari Passu Wipeout in the Southern District, CREDIT
SLIPS (Nov. 25, 2012, 11:56 PM), http://www.creditslips.org/creditslips/2012/11/pari-passuwipeout-in-the-southern-district.html.
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III offers a new mechanism for addressing the systemic difficulties inherent
in sovereign bond restructurings.
I. FROM MECHANISMS TO COLLECTIVES: THE CURRENT STATE OF
SOVEREIGN BOND RESTRUCTURINGS
Before analyzing the challenges that arise during restructurings, this Note
provides background information about sovereign bonds. Part I.A begins
with a basic overview of sovereign bonds and defines the relevant
terminology. Part I.B discusses the qualities that make sovereign bonds
unique. Next, Part I.C examines the reasons countries may be reluctant to
initiate a bond restructuring. Finally, Part I.D evaluates the problems with
restructurings and explores the various efforts of the international
community and the bond market to resolve them.
A. The Basics of Bonds and Sovereign Bonds
Any study of sovereign bond restructurings must begin with an
understanding of the relevant subject matter. Black’s Law Dictionary
defines a bond as an obligation or a promise; more specifically, a written
promise to pay money after a certain time elapses.10 The date when the full
payment is due is referred to as the date of maturity.11 Bonds are a type of
debt instrument, meaning they are a type of written legal document that
defines rights, duties, entitlements, or liabilities.12 The purchaser of a
bond—the investor or creditor—is essentially loaning money to the
issuer—the debtor—for a fixed period of time.13
In return for their purchase, investors receive a guarantee that they will
have the principal14 amount repaid by a certain future date, and that they
will receive interest payments at certain intervals.15 The amount of interest
the bond is going to pay on the basis of predetermined intervals, stated in
percentage terms, is known as the coupon rate.16 The details pertaining to
the expected repayment, including the interest rate, are laid out in the bond
contract, also known as a bond indenture.17

10. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 200 (9th ed. 2009); see also MARK MOBIUS, BONDS:
AN INTRODUCTION TO THE CORE CONCEPTS 2 (1st ed. 2012) (“Bonds are basically long-term
IOUs between a borrower and a lender.”).
11. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 10, at 452; see also MOBIUS, supra note
10, at 4.
12. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 10, at 869.
13. See MOBIUS, supra note 10, at 2.
14. Principal is “[t]he amount of a debt, investment, or other fund, not including interest,
earnings, or profits.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 10, at 1312.
15. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 10, at 869; see also MOBIUS, supra note
10, at 2–3.
16. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 10, at 888; see also MOBIUS, supra note
10, at 3.
17. See MOBIUS, supra note 10, at 3.
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The face value of a bond reflects its dollar value at the time it is to be
repaid—typically the principal plus the total interest.18 However, the face
value of a bond is not necessarily equal to its price.19 Bonds are often
traded on the secondary market before they reach maturity,20 so the price
may change in response to a number of factors, including the rise and fall of
interest rates and the credit quality of the debtor.21 The risk that a debtor
will default22 on its bonds can also lower the price of the bonds on the
market.23
Sovereign debt is debt that governments incur (typically, the
governments of developing countries) to foreign investors seeking a
profitable return.24 This definition of sovereign debt includes funds raised
abroad through the issuance of bonds in foreign capital markets.25
Sovereign debt allows governments to borrow substantial capital.26
Governments typically repay much of what they borrow.27 However,
repayment can be complicated and often involves delays, renegotiations,
public intervention, default, and restructuring.28
When sovereigns are unable to repay what they borrow, they may enter
into what is known as a sovereign debt restructuring.29 A sovereign debt
restructuring is a legal process involving the exchange of outstanding
sovereign debt, usually in the form of loans or bonds, for new debt
instruments or cash.30 Sovereigns typically restructure after they default on

18. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 10, at 888; see also MOBIUS, supra note
10, at 3.
19. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 10, at 888; see also MOBIUS, supra note
10, at 3.
20. Maturity is the date on which the principal is paid back and the last interest payment
is made. MOBIUS, supra note 10, at 4.
21. See id.
22. Default is “the failure to pay a debt when due.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra
note 10, at 480.
23. See MOBIUS, supra note 10, at 51.
24. See Jonathan Eaton & Raquel Fernandez, Sovereign Debt 1 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 5131, 1995), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/
w5131.pdf.
25. See supra notes 12–21 and accompanying text; see also MOBIUS, supra note 10, at 3;
Eaton & Fernandez, supra note 24, at 1.
26. See Eaton & Fernandez, supra note 24, at 1; see also Alinna Arora & Rodrigo
Olivares Caminal, Rethinking the Sovereign Debt Restructuring Approach, 9 L. & BUS. REV.
AM. 629, 629 (2003) (“Debt has been the largest source of capital flow to developing
countries in the past fifty years.”).
27. See Eaton & Fernandez, supra note 24, at 1; see also Brian Perry, Are Sovereign
Bonds Worth the Risk?, FORBES (June 21, 2011, 3:25 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/
investor/2011/06/21/are-sovereign-bonds-worth-the-risk/.
28. See Eaton & Fernandez, supra note 24, at 1.
29. See Arora & Caminal, supra note 26, at 630.
30. See Udaibir S. Das, Michael G. Papaioannou & Christoph Trebesch, Sovereign Debt
Restructurings 1950–2010: Literature Survey, Data, and Stylized Facts 7 (IMF Working
Grp., Monetary & Capital Mkts. Dep’t, Working Paper No. 12/203, 2012), available at
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2012/wp12203.pdf; see also Arora & Caminal,
supra note 26, at 630.
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their debt.31 A restructuring that takes place after a sovereign has defaulted
is known as a post-default restructuring.32 When a sovereign defaults, its
debt payments are usually accelerated33—meaning creditors are entitled to
immediate and full repayment of the face value of the debt.34
There are generally two main elements in a debt restructuring: debt
rescheduling and debt reduction.35 A debt rescheduling lengthens the
maturities of the old debt, which may also entail a decrease in interest
rates.36 Debt reschedulings are considered a type of debt relief because
they shift payments into the future.37 Debt reduction is a reduction in the
face value of the old instruments.38 Both debt reschedulings and debt
reductions can involve a “haircut,” which is a loss in the face value of the
creditors’ claims.39 This Note focuses on distressed bond restructurings,
which are restructurings at terms that are less favorable than the original
bond terms.40 Specifically, this Note is concerned with debt restructurings
with foreign private bondholders.
Sovereign debt has vacillated between bank lending and bond lending
over the last two centuries.41 In the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries, sovereign debt was primarily in the form of bond lending.42
Following that period, and up until the 1990s, medium- and long-term bank
loan agreements made up the majority of sovereign debt.43 Since the
1990s, the majority of sovereign debt is once again in the form of bond
debt.44 International bonds are typically issued in financial centers, under

31. See Das, Papaioannou & Trebesch, supra note 30, at 8; see also Arora & Caminal,
supra note 26, at 630.
32. See Das, Papaioannou & Trebesch, supra note 30, at 8; see also Arora & Caminal,
supra note 26, at 630.
33. Acceleration clauses are standard in most sovereign debt contracts. See Das,
Papaioannou & Trebesch, supra note 30, at 47. In the event of any missed payments, all
principal and accrued interest can become immediately due and payable. See id.
Acceleration usually requires a minority vote of at least 25 percent of outstanding
principal—meaning bondholders holding a collective amount of debt greater than or equal to
25 percent. See id.
34. See id. at 10.
35. See id. at 7.
36. See id.
37. See id.; see also Arora & Caminal, supra note 26, at 630.
38. See Das, Papaioannou & Trebesch, supra note 30, at 7; see also Arora & Caminal,
supra note 26, at 630.
39. See Das, Papaioannou & Trebesch, supra note 30, at 7; see also Arora & Caminal,
supra note 26, at 630.
40. See Das, Papaioannou & Trebesch, supra note 30, at 7; see also Arora & Caminal,
supra note 26, at 630.
41. See A. Mechele Dickerson, A Politically Viable Approach to Sovereign Debt
Restructuring, 53 EMORY L.J. 997, 1012 (2004).
42. See Enrique R. Carrasco & Randall Thomas, Encouraging Relational Investment and
Controlling Portfolio Investment in Developing Countries in the Aftermath of the Mexican
Financial Crisis, 34 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 539, 546–68 (1996).
43. See Lee C. Buchheit, Cross-Border Lending: What’s Different This Time?, 16 NW.
J. INT’L L. & BUS. 44, 46–51 (1995).
44. See Lee C. Buchheit & G. Mitu Gulati, Sovereign Bonds and the Collective Will, 51
EMORY L.J. 1317, 1334–35 (2002).
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the laws of the place where the financial center is located.45 New York and
English law bonds are the most common.46
In the United States, most sovereign bonds are issued under a fiscal
agency agreement.47
When bonds are issued under fiscal agency
agreements, a fiscal agent is appointed as the agent of the bond issuer
itself—for this Note’s purposes, the sovereign debtor.48 The fiscal agent is
typically an investment bank serving as the underwriter for the bond
offering.49 Fiscal agency agreements do not give the fiscal agent exclusive
enforcement rights.50 Rather, each bondholder has the right to bring legal
action against the sovereign in the event of default.51 Each bondholder has
the right to demand full payment of the principal amount of its bond, and to
sue the sovereign debtor to collect the payment in the event of default.52
In contrast, bonds issued under a trust indenture limit the rights of
individual bondholders.53 Individual bondholders under a trust indenture
only have the right to sue the debtor for payments of interest and principal
that are not made on their due dates.54 Only the trustee possesses the right
to accelerate payment of the principal amount of all bonds and to sue the
debtor for the total amount.55
B. Why Sovereign Debt Is Unique
Sovereign debt differs from private debt in three important ways. First,
in an abstract sense, a country can always service—meaning, pay—its
debt.56 This can be accomplished by increasing taxes or by diverting funds
from other projects.57 As a result, it is difficult to determine if a country is
insolvent.58 In contrast, a corporation’s ability to service its debt is
45. See Das, Papaioannou & Trebesch, supra note 30, at 41.
46. See id.
47. See Buchheit & Gulati, supra note 44, at 1332.
48. See id.
49. See Jill E. Fisch & Caroline M. Gentile, Vultures or Vanguards?: The Role of
Litigation in Sovereign Debt Restructuring, 53 EMORY L.J. 1043, 1102 (2004).
50. See Buchheit & Gulati, supra note 44, at 1332.
51. See id.
52. See Fisch & Gentile, supra note 49, at 1102–03.
53. See id. at 1103.
54. See id.
55. See id.
56. See Gunter Dufey, Corporate Debt vs. Country Debt: Distinguishing Between
Liquidity and Solvency Problems, in PRIVATE SECTOR SOLUTIONS TO THE LATIN AMERICAN
DEBT PROBLEM 35, 45 n.2 (Robert Grosse ed., 1992) (“Debt service is defined simply as the
timely payment of interest.”); see also Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati & Eric A. Posner, The
Evolution of Contractual Terms in Sovereign Bonds, 4 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 131, 133 (2012)
(“Even sovereigns in financial distress may arguably have some ability to liquidate assets to
repay their debts subject to the constraints imposed by their populations. Greece, for
example, could theoretically sell the Parthenon or some of its sovereign territory.”).
57. See Jack Boorman, Special Advisor to the Managing Dir., Int’l Monetary Fund,
Sovereign Debt Restructuring: Where Stands the Debate? (Oct. 17, 2002), available at
http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2002/101702.htm (describing the political, social,
and moral threshold beyond which a country cannot justify further financial constraints).
58. See Jonathan Sedlak, Sovereign Debt Restructuring: Statutory Reform or
Contractual Solution?, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1483, 1487 (2004).

906

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82

grounded in the value of the firm’s assets and the burden of its
obligations.59
A sovereign’s ability to service its debt may include a similar initial
analysis, but it also involves political, social, and moral questions.60 These
additional factors lead to the conclusion that there is a threshold limitation
to a country’s willingness to service its debt.61 However, because of the
imprecise nature of these additional factors, “it seems impossible to predict
when this point will be reached.”62 Furthermore, changes in political
leadership could potentially change the sovereign’s calculus for determining
the costs and benefits of defaulting on sovereign debt.63
The second difference between corporate and sovereign debt is that a
country can use little as collateral to guarantee the value of its debt.64 As a
consequence, most sovereign debt is unsecured.65 Secured debt plays a
major role in corporate bankruptcies due to the belief that security increases
the likelihood of payment in the event that the company goes bankrupt.66
Because sovereign debt is typically unsecured, it does not lend itself to the
use of domestic bankruptcy law as a model for sovereign debt
restructuring.67 Moreover, it is nearly impossible for creditors to rely on a
sovereign’s domestic assets in satisfaction of the debt, which is why Elliott
Associates sought control of the Argentine naval ship while it was docked
in Ghana.68
Thirdly, courts have extremely limited ability to force sovereign entities
to comply with their rulings.69 The traditional state law methods of debt
collection are inapplicable to sovereign debt.70 Furthermore, there is

59. See CHARLES J. TABB & RALPH BRUBAKER, BANKRUPTCY LAW PRINCIPLES, POLICIES
PRACTICE 663 (3d ed. 2010) (noting that a company’s decision to enter bankruptcy
depends on an evaluation of its assets and expenses).
60. See Boorman, supra note 57.
61. See id.
62. Sedlak, supra note 58, at 1488.
63. See id.
64. See Eaton & Fernandez, supra note 24, at 2.
65. “Unsecured debt” is defined as “[a] debt not supported by collateral or other
security.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 10, at 463.
66. See Steven L. Harris & Charles W. Mooney, Jr., A Property-Based Theory of
Security Interests: Taking Debtors’ Choices Seriously, 80 VA. L. REV. 2021, 2067 (1994).
67. See Sedlak, supra note 58, at 1488–89.
68. See supra notes 1–9 and accompanying text.
69. See Eaton & Fernandez, supra note 24, at 2.
70. Traditionally, a creditor sues a debtor in civil court when the debtor has defaulted on
its unsecured debt. See 2 WILLIAM L. NORTON, JR. & WILLIAM L. NORTON III, NORTON
BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE § 20:1 (3d ed. 2008). A creditor must demonstrate the
existence of a debt and the debtor’s failure to pay the debt. Id. § 17:1; see also 11 U.S.C.
§ 109 (2006). The creditor can then obtain a writ of execution, which allows him to request
the seizure and sale of the debtor’s property. See TABB & BRUBAKER, supra note 59, at 15.
However, the creditor does not need to sue a debtor when the debt is secured, as long as the
property can be secured without a breach of the peace. See id. at 14. If the property cannot
be secured peacefully, the procedure for recovery will be similar to that of unsecured debt.
If these remedies are insufficient or unworkable, creditors can force the liquidation of a
corporation through federal bankruptcy laws. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 701–784 (explaining the
process of liquidation in bankruptcy proceedings).
AND
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presently no intergovernmental agency to adjudicate disputes between
creditors and sovereign states.71 Due to the absence of an international
bankruptcy regime, sovereign debt restructurings are typically guided by
the use of the contractual mechanisms contained in the sovereign bond
contracts.72
International financial institutions (IFIs) often offer new loans to
sovereigns while they are attempting to restructure their debts with
creditors.73 When the International Monetary Fund (IMF) acts as the IFI, it
often conditions loans on certain economic policy reforms.74 The IMF
often lends to sovereigns that are unable to secure loans from private
lenders, and on terms unavailable in capital markets.75 The prospect of an
IMF support package may create what is known as a “moral hazard risk.”76
The moral hazard risk is the risk that IMF loans will encourage
sovereigns to maintain domestic economic policies that are fiscally unsound
and to borrow recklessly from private capital markets.77 Sovereigns may be
encouraged to make risky borrowing decisions based on the belief that the
IMF will intervene with funds before a default or during a restructuring.78
Moreover, IMF lending may insulate sovereigns from the damages of
imprudent borrowing.79
IMF lending may create a moral hazard dilemma for lenders, as well.80
When a realistic risk of default exists, creditors have a greater incentive to
monitor their loans.81 Conversely, if a lender of last resort reduces the
chances of default, creditors have a lesser incentive to monitor their loans.82
Creditors arguably are encouraged to lend recklessly and take excessive

71. See infra notes 185–96 and accompanying text.
72. See Arora & Caminal, supra note 26, at 632.
73. See Dickerson, supra note 41, at 1009.
74. See id.
75. See id.; see also Arora & Caminal, supra note 26, at 642 (“[A] large scale private
lending during a crisis has never taken place and it is primarily the IMF that has always
provided the bail-outs to defaulting sovereign nations. This is why the IMF has become
known as the International Lender of Last Resort (ILOLR) or the IMH (Institute for Moral
Hazard).”). For a discussion of Moral Hazard, see infra notes 77–85 and accompanying text.
76. See Dickerson, supra note 41, at 1009; see also Arora & Caminal, supra note 26, at
642.
77. See Robert J. Barro, The IMF Doesn’t Put Out Fires, It Starts Them, BUS. WK., Dec.
7, 1998, at 18, available at http://scholar.harvard.edu/barro/files/98_1207_imf_bw.pdf; see
also Charles W. Calomiris, The IMF’s Imprudent Role As Lender of Last Resort, 17 CATO J.
275, 277; Dickerson, supra note 41, at 1009.
78. See Dickerson, supra note 41, at 1010–11; see also Alon Seveg, When Countries Go
Bust: Proposals for Debtor and Creditor Resolution, 3 ASPER REV. INT’L BUS. & TRADE L.
25, 44 (2003) (“For example, if a country’s debt were written off automatically once it
reached a certain level, governments would have an incentive to over-borrow because they
would receive the benefit of the loan without incurring the cost of repaying it.”).
79. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Sovereign Debt Restructuring:
A Bankruptcy
Reorganization Approach, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 956, 961–62 (2000).
80. See Dickerson, supra note 41, at 1011; see also Seveg, supra note 78, at 44
(“Similarly, [creditors] would have an artificial incentive to make high-risk loans if they
were automatically ‘rescued’ when their loans could not be repaid by debtors.”).
81. See Barrow, supra note 77, at 18; Calomiris, supra note 77, at 277.
82. See Barrow, supra note 77, at 18; Calomiris, supra note 77, at 277.
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risks.83 An IMF financial package given to a distressed sovereign insulates
the creditors from the costs of their inadequate risk assessment.84 In
addition, if the sovereign initiates debt restructuring negotiations or defaults
on its debt, the potential for an IMF support package may alter creditors’
incentives to renegotiate and could cause them to refuse to make
concessions.85
C. Why Sovereigns May Be Reluctant To Restructure
Their Sovereign Bonds
Sovereigns facing liquidity problems often go to great lengths to avoid
restructuring their debts to foreign creditors.86 Part I.C.1 to Part I.C.3
discusses the reasons why sovereigns may be reluctant to initiate a
restructuring when faced with a financial crisis.
1. Economic Dislocation
Sovereigns facing liquidity problems often avoid restructuring their debts
because a restructuring can impose severe economic costs on the
sovereign.87 Even an orderly restructuring can devastate a sovereign’s
domestic financial system.88 For example, Argentina justified the terms of
its 2005 bond exchange by claiming it could not continue to pay creditors
without jeopardizing Argentine citizens’ housing, jobs, education, and
healthcare.89 Loans from IFIs, like the IMF, allow sovereigns to postpone
the initiation of a restructuring by providing needed capital in the form of
loans or grants.90 While orderly restructurings may be worrisome, a
disorderly restructuring can make a bad situation worse by blocking a
country’s access to private capital for several years.91
2. Tarnishing the Sovereign’s Reputation
Sovereigns may also seek to avoid debt restructuring out of a concern
that it will signal that they are not creditworthy.92 One of the primary costs
83. See Dickerson, supra note 41, at 1011.
84. See Hal S. Scott, A Bankruptcy Procedure for Sovereign Debtors?, 37 INT’L LAW.
103, 113 (2003).
85. See William W. Bratton & G. Mitu Gulati, Sovereign Debt Reform and the Best
Interest of Creditors, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1, 17–18 (2004).
86. See Anne Krueger, First Deputy Managing Dir., Int’l Monetary Fund, International
Financial Architecture for 2002: A New Approach to Sovereign Debt Restructuring (Nov.
26, 2001), available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2001/112601.htm.
87. See id.
88. See id.
89. See Nestor Kirchner, President of the Republic of Arg., Discurso del Señor
Presidente de la Nación, Doctor Nestor Kirchner, Ante la Honorable Asamblea Legislativa
[Inaugural Address Before the Legislative Assembly] (May 25, 2003), available at
http://www.casarosada.gov.ar/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=24414&cat
id=28:discursos-ant; see also infra notes 281–305 and accompanying text.
90. See supra notes 73–85 and accompanying text.
91. See Krueger, supra note 86.
92. See Dickerson, supra note 41, at 1007.
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of defaulting on debt is the sovereign’s exclusion from future borrowing.93
Regardless of whether a sovereign defaults strategically or out of financial
distress, a default transfers a gain from creditors to the debtor sovereign.94
This may trigger a phenomenon known as a “lender embargo.”95 A lender
embargo occurs when creditors are unwilling to lend to a sovereign,
effectively blocking the sovereign’s access to credit markets.96 Once a
country defaults, it will not be able to access the international private capital
markets until it has restructured its debt.97
Sovereigns may choose to initiate a restructuring when they are able but
unwilling to pay their debt.98 Policymakers may choose to save a country’s
resources for the needs of domestic constituents instead of repaying external
creditors during times of financial distress.99 Furthermore, a sovereign may
be unwilling to enact reforms or pursue the fiscal adjustments necessary to
achieve debt sustainability.100 As a result, a government may default and
restructure its debt even though it is capable of repaying the debts in full.101
Distinguishing between necessary and opportunistic defaults by
sovereigns can be challenging for creditors.102 A sovereign interested in
avoiding payment can attempt to manufacture a crisis—for example, by
overspending—to make it seem as though it is financially distressed and at
risk of defaulting on its debts.103 Opportunistic defaults enable sovereigns
to drastically reduce their debt burdens, thereby externalizing the cost of
default on creditors who face reductions in the value of their investments.104
Ecuador’s 2008 default is an example of a sovereign opportunistically
defaulting.105 In November 2008, Ecuador suspended payment on two
bonds after an audit commission declared the debts “immoral,” “illegal,”
and “illegitimate.”106 Ecuador defaulted on its debt obligations, and
subsequently initiated a debt exchange which repurchased the two bonds at
a discount of 65 to 70 percent on their face value.107 Creditors attempted to
block the offer, but ultimately 95 percent of outstanding bonds were
93. See Bratton & Gulati, supra note 85, at 14.
94. See id.
95. See id.
96. See id.
97. See Anne Krueger, First Deputy Managing Dir., Int’l Monetary Fund, The
Difference Is in the Debt: Crisis Resolution in Latin America (Nov. 14, 2003), available at
http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2003/111403a.htm.
98. See Michael Tomz & Mark L.J. Wright, Do Countries Default in “Bad Times”? 1, 6
(Fed. Reserve Bank of S.F., Working Paper No. 2007-17, 2007), available at
http://www.frbsf.org/publications/economics/papers/2007/wp07-17bk.pdf; see also Das,
Papaioannou & Trebesch, supra note 30, at 67.
99. See Das, Papaioannou & Trebesch, supra note 30, at 67.
100. See id.
101. See Tomz & Wright, supra note 98, at 7; Das, Papaioannou & Trebesch, supra note
30, at 67.
102. See Choi, Gulati & Posner, supra note 56, at 132–33.
103. See id.
104. See id. at 133.
105. See Das, Papaioannou & Trebesch, supra note 30, at 78.
106. See id.
107. See id.
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exchanged in the restructuring.108 Ecuador’s default was not triggered by a
severe economic crisis, and the ratio of public debt to gross domestic
product (GDP) at the time of default was only 23 percent.109 In contrast,
Argentina’s public debt to GDP ratio a year after its 2001 default was 130
percent.110
3. Uncertainty About What Awaits
Sovereigns cannot reasonably predict the likelihood of successfully
restructuring.111 Despite the enormous sums of money being lent to
sovereigns, there is no international framework to coordinate sovereign
defaults.112 This is not the case in the corporate context. The United States
has a detailed legal framework for corporate bankruptcy wherein debtor
companies may undergo reorganization or liquidation.113 The debtor
company, its creditors, and courts devote significant resources towards
determining whether the company should be reorganized or liquidated.114
Sovereigns cannot be liquidated, so reorganization is the goal of any
sovereign debt restructuring.115
Yet, sovereigns often avoid restructurings because of the inherent
uncertainty regarding the results of the reorganization process.116
Negotiating a debt restructuring can be a long and unpredictable process.117
Without an orderly international framework, restructuring sovereign debt
108. See id.
109. See id.
110. See Abaclat v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5, Decision on
Jurisdiction and Admissibility, ¶ 63 (Aug. 4, 2011), https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/
FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docId=DC3130_En&caseId=C
95 [hereinafter Abaclat].
111. See Dickerson, supra note 41, at 1007.
112. See Seveg, supra note 78, at 25.
113. U.S. bankruptcy law is governed by Title 11 of the U.S. Code. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101–
1330 (2006).
114. The parties and the court both scrutinize whether the debtor company’s value
following a reorganization will be greater than the value of its assets sold piecemeal.
Although a corporate debtor can choose either option at the beginning of a bankruptcy case,
most initially opt for reorganization which is governed by Chapter 11. See 11 U.S.C.
§ 706(a) (permitting the debtor-company to convert a liquidation into a reorganization).
However, the judge may convert the reorganization into a liquidation for a variety of
reasons, including instances when no “reasonable likelihood of rehabilitation” exists or when
the debtor is unable to “effectuate a plan” of reorganization. 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b)(1)–(2).
115. See, e.g., Rory Macmillian, Towards a Sovereign Debt Work-Out System, 16 NW. J.
INT’L. L. & BUS. 57, 75 (1995) (“Debates over whether reorganization or liquidation is more
efficient for failing corporate debtors are inappropriate in the context of government debtors:
there can be no talk of an economically efficient liquidation and distribution of a people’s
government.” (citation omitted)).
116. See Dickerson, supra note 41, at 1007.
117. See Seveg, supra note 78, at 46–47; see also John B. Taylor, Under Sec’y of
Treasury for Int’l Affairs, Sovereign Debt Restructuring: A US Perspective (Apr. 2, 2002),
available at http://www.iie.com/publications/papers/paper.cfm?ResearchID=455 (“This
uncertainty complicates decision-making for everyone—the private sector, the official
sector, and the sovereign government itself. A more predictable sovereign debt restructuring
process for countries that reach unsustainable debt positions would help reduce this
uncertainty.”).
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has proven to be costly for both creditors and debtor nations.118 The longer
negotiations drag on, the more likely it is that the sovereign will drain its
resources and will be unable to pay its debt obligations.119 The process
itself entails certain added costs, as restructurings typically require debtor
governments to retain legal and financial advisors for the duration of the
restructuring.120
Legal advisors help sovereigns predict possible legal hurdles inherent in
a restructuring and can provide an overview of the legal characteristics of
the bonds.121 They may also assist in drafting the bond exchange
documentation and the terms of the new bonds.122 Financial advisors often
help to identify and reach out to bondholders and can play a key role in
designing the financial terms of the exchange.123 These advisors add to the
cost of the restructuring because the sovereign must pay legal and financial
fees, as well as travel expenses, while the restructuring is conducted.124
Restructurings may also create administrative costs because government
staff and officials may need to invest months of work while preparing and
implementing a debt exchange.125 A sovereign’s ability to incur the costs
associated with a restructuring may lend support to the creditors’ belief that
the sovereign is engaging in an opportunistic restructuring.126
D. Systemic Complications with Restructuring: Catalyst for a Change
Part I.D explores the fundamental problems with sovereign bond
contracts that spurred the international community into action. Part I.D.1
explores the unanimous action clauses of sovereign bond contracts. Part
I.D.2 discusses the way investors were able to take advantage of these
clauses and develop a holdout investment strategy at sovereign debtors’
expense.
1. Unanimous Action Clauses
The majority of sovereign bonds are issued under New York law.127
Until recently, sovereign bonds issued under New York law contained
Unanimous Action Clauses (UAC).128 The payment terms of a bond with a
UAC can only be modified with the unanimous approval of the bondholders
118. See Seveg, supra note 78, at 25.
119. See id.; see also Barry Eichengreen, Restructuring Sovereign Debt, J. ECON. PERSP.
1, 4 (2003), available at http://emlab.berkeley.edu/~eichengr/research/journaleconomic
perspectivesaprileditsep22-03.pdf (detailing how countries expend cash reserves and
increase interest rates to avoid suspending debt payments).
120. See Das, Papaioannou & Trebesch, supra note 30, at 21.
121. See id.
122. See id.
123. See id.
124. See id. at 65.
125. See id.
126. See supra notes 98–110 and accompanying text.
127. See Das, Papaioannou & Trebesch, supra note 30, at 41.
128. See Dickerson, supra note 41, at 1014; see also Arora & Caminal, supra note 26, at
637.
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of that issue.129 Consequently, each bondholder has the potential to veto
any restructuring attempt.130 As a result, the sovereign debtor must
conclude a debt restructuring agreement with every individual bondholder
in order to secure debt relief.131
2. The Holdout Problem
Because the payment terms of a bond issued with UACs cannot be
amended or restructured unless all outstanding bondholders agree to the
alteration, they are inherently difficult to restructure.132 Some creditors
may reject the new amendment133 and decide to hold on to their old debt
instead.134 In an effort to have an amendment accepted, a sovereign debtor
has incentives to make side payments to obstinate creditors.135 The
sovereign debtor thereby inadvertently encourages future holdouts.136
A holdout creditor receives the benefit of a side payment and may also
pursue legal remedies to recover the full value of its debt.137 If the holdout
creditor succeeds in litigating its claim, it may deplete the funds available to
satisfy the claims of other similarly situated creditors.138 Even if the
holdout does not succeed in litigation, the unanimity requirement of a UAC
provision enables a single holdout to halt the entire restructuring process
while the claim is litigated, thereby delaying the process for long periods of
time.139
Holdouts are capable of preventing a potentially successful
restructuring140 and are burdensome on the citizens of the debtor nation.141
129. See Michael Bradley, James D. Cox & Mitu Gulati, The Market Reaction to Legal
Shocks and Their Antidotes: Lessons from the Sovereign Debt Market, 39 J. LEGAL STUD.
289, 295 (2010).
130. See id.; see also Arora & Caminal, supra note 26, at 637.
131. See Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati & Eric A. Posner, The Dynamics of Contract
Evolution 9 (Univ. Chi. Law Sch., Chi. Inst. for Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 605,
2012), available at http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=5298&
context=faculty_scholarship.
132. See Dickerson, supra note 41, at 1013.
133. The amendment is accomplished by an exchange of the old bond for new bonds
governed by a new bond contract with amended terms. See Das, Papaioannou & Trebesch,
supra note 30, at 21–23. A high participation rate by bondholders is key to an exchange
offer. See id. at 22. Therefore, most exchange offers include terms that generate incentives
for participation, such as upfront cash repayments or advantageous legal features of the new
bonds. See id. Another strategy is to allow bondholders to choose among different new debt
instruments, thereby accounting for differing preferences among creditors. See id. at 23. For
example, retail investors often prefer new bonds with no cut in principal and are willing to
accept long maturity and low coupons. See id. In contrast, institutional investors tend to
prefer bonds with a principal haircut but shorter maturities and higher coupons. See id.
134. See Christopher C. Wheeler & Amir Attaran, Declawing the Vulture Funds:
Rehabilitation of a Comity Defense in Sovereign Debt Litigation, 39 STAN. J. INT’L L. 253,
259 (2003).
135. See id. at 259–60.
136. See id.
137. See id. at 260.
138. See id.
139. See Dickerson, supra note 41, at 1014.
140. See Wheeler & Attaran, supra note 134, at 253.
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Over USD 2 billion in claims have been filed by holdout creditors against
heavily indebted, poor countries.142 These claims often account for a
considerable percentage of the country’s GDP.143 For example, the
Republic of Congo faced sovereign debt litigation claims equal to roughly
15 percent of its GDP.144
i. The Vulture Funds Are Circling
Vulture funds—as they are pejoratively called—are funds that specialize
in distressed assets.145 A vulture fund is a new type of holdout creditor that
has emerged since the shift to bond-based sovereign debt.146 A vulture
fund becomes a creditor by purchasing sovereign debt at a discount on the
secondary market.147 The discount typically occurs after a sovereign has
defaulted and stems from concerns that the sovereign will need to
restructure its debt, or that the sovereign is already mired in a long debt
restructuring process.148 In the event of a restructuring, vulture funds
typically refuse to participate and attempt to collect the full face value of
the claim from the sovereign debtor by litigating their claim.149
The vulture fund investment strategy is typically to purchase discounted
bonds after a sovereign has defaulted, and then wait to see whether the
market rises or falls with respect to the value of the debt.150 If the market
improves, the vulture fund benefits in two ways.151 First, the vulture fund
now holds a profitable investment compared to its initial purchase.152
Second, the vulture fund has a stronger position going into restructuring
negotiations and will be more effective in holding out against the
restructuring.153 Vulture funds may also profit by suing sovereigns for the
full value of the defaulted debt.154
The United States has heard eleven cases brought by commercial
investors against the governments of Cameroon, the Republic of Congo,
and Nicaragua alone.155 The investors have claimed approximately USD
695 million on debts which had an original face value of USD 195.9
141. See LEX RIEFFEL, RESTRUCTURING SOVEREIGN DEBT: THE CASE FOR AD HOC
MACHINERY 111–12 (2003).
142. See Das, Papaioannou & Trebesch, supra note 30, at 50.
143. See id.
144. See id. at 50–51.
145. See Wheeler & Attaran, supra note 134, at 254.
146. See id.
147. See id.; see also Seveg, supra note 78, at 47.
148. See Ryan E. Avery, Out of the Desert and to the Oasis: Legislation on Predatory
Debt Investing, 18 U. MIAMI INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 267, 276 (2011); see also Seveg, supra
note 78, at 47.
149. See Wheeler & Attaran, supra note 134, at 254.
150. See Avery, supra note 148, at 276.
151. See id.
152. See id.
153. See id. at 276–77.
154. See, e.g., infra notes 160–75, 315–33 and accompanying text.
155. See Elizabeth Broomfield, Subduing the Vultures: Assessing Government Caps on
Recovery in Sovereign Debt Litigation, 2010 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 473, 507.
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million.156 The vulture funds have secured judgments of USD 659.4
million.157 Argentina now faces similar litigation at the hands of one of the
most well-known vulture funds: Elliott Associates.158
ii. King of the Vultures: Elliott Associates
Elliott Associates is a New York–based hedge fund credited with
pioneering the vulture fund model in the 1990s.159 Elliott is perhaps best
known for its successful holdout litigation against Peru, in which the fund
recovered 400 percent of what it paid for Peru’s debt.160 More recently,
Elliott Associates has been attempting to collect on defaulted Argentine
bonds through one of its subsidiaries, NML Capital.161 NML Capital is the
vulture fund responsible for seizing the Argentine ship in Ghana and is the
plaintiff in the Second Circuit litigation over Argentine bonds.162
Elliott’s litigation against Peru163 began in federal court in New York.164
Elliott had purchased Peruvian debt on the secondary market and had
refused to enter into the Brady165 restructuring.166 The case went up to the
Second Circuit, where the court ruled in Elliott’s favor.167
156. See id.
157. See id.
158. See Michael Cooper & Leslie Wayne, Publicity-Shy Giuliani Backer Is Thrust into
Spotlight, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 22, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/22/us/politics/
22singer.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
159. See Nick Dearden, Greece: Here Come the Vulture Funds, GUARDIAN (May 17,
2012, 11:35 AM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2012/may/17/greece-vulturefunds; see also Seveg, supra note 78, at 39.
160. See Nick Dearden, Vulture Funds—Coming to a Country Near You?, HUFFINGTON
POST (Feb. 8, 2011, 1:00 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/nick-dearden/vulture-fundscoming-to-a_b_914691.html; see also Seveg, supra note 78, at 39.
161. Seveg, supra note 78, at 39.
162. See id.; see also supra notes 1–9, 159–84 and accompanying text.
163. Peru faced prior litigation in the 1990s in the case Pravin Banker Associates v.
Banco Popular del Peru, 895 F. Supp. 660 (S.D.N.Y. 1995), and the subsequent appeal
Pravin Banker Associates v. Banco Popular del Peru, 109 F.3d 850 (2d Cir. 1997). Pravin
Banker had purchased small amounts of Peruvian debt in the secondary market and refused
to participate in the liquidation process that followed. See Bradley, Cox & Gulati, supra note
129, at 291; see also Seveg, supra note 78, at 50. Peru’s central bank was unable to pay its
creditors. See Pravin, 109 F.3d at 853; see also Seveg, supra note 78, at 50. Instead of
restructuring its debt, the bank appointed a committee of liquidators tasked with dissolving
the bank and distributing its liquidated assets. See Pravin, 109 F.3d at 853. Rather than join
the liquidation proceedings, Pravin brought suit against Peru’s national bank. See id. The
case was tried in New York because the bonds were issued under New York law. See
Bradley, Cox & Gulati, supra note 129, at 291. The lower court granted Peru multiple stays
but ultimately ruled against Peru. See id. On appeal, the Second Circuit rejected Peru’s
defense and ruled in favor of Pravin Banker out of an interest in enforcing contractual
provisions. See id. Ultimately, Pravin Banker was unable to enforce its victory because it
lacked a mechanism by which it could seize Peruvian assets. See id. This is the same reason
Elliott sought seizure of the Argentine vessel in Ghana. See supra notes 1–9 and
accompanying text.
164. See Bradley, Cox & Gulati, supra note 129, at 292.
165. During the 1980s, many of the world’s least developed countries were unable to
service their debt due to high debt levels, a decline in commodity prices, the appreciation of
the U.S. dollar, and a sharp increase in interest rates. See Brian Lucey & Svitlana
Voronkova, Securitising International Sovereign Debt, in PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL
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In the wake of its victory, Elliott sought attachment orders in multiple
jurisdictions—including the United States, Canada, Belgium, the
Netherlands, Luxemburg, England, and Germany—against the payments
Peru sought to make on its restructured Brady bonds.168 The district court
in New York, hearing the case on remand from the Second Circuit, issued
an attachment order in excess of USD 55 million against Peru.169 The
attachment order effectively prevented J.P. Morgan Chase Bank—the fiscal
agent responsible for making payments to Peru’s bondholders—from
transferring payments to the bondholders who participated in the
restructuring.170
Peru then sought to use the Euroclear Bank in Brussels to make the
payments.171 However, Elliott had already filed an attachment order in
Brussels and the Court of Appeals in Brussels granted the injunction.172
Peru now faced the risk of defaulting on its Brady bonds.173 To avoid
default and the consequences that came along with it, Peru settled with
Elliott for USD 56.3 million.174 Elliott had purchased the bonds—worth
USD 20 million of Peruvian debt—on the secondary market for a
discounted price of USD 11.4 million.175
The Elliott litigation was the first time a holdout creditor effectively used
a litigation strategy to gain a disproportionate payment from a sovereign as
compared to other similarly situated bondholders.176 Prior to Elliott
Associates, L.P. v. De la Nacion, holdouts had used litigation against
sovereigns largely as an annoyance strategy.177 Elliott’s success potentially
altered the risks for all outstanding sovereign bonds because the pari passu
clause178 at the heart of Elliott’s claim against Peru is included in all
DEBT 135, 135–36 (Constantin Gurdgiev et al. eds., 2007). In 1989, in response to the debt
crisis, Brady bonds were introduced as a form of debt reduction. See id. at 136. The
Secretary of the U.S. Treasury, Nicholas Brady, suggested the bonds as a way to relieve the
debt burden of the least developed countries. See id. The United States and international
agencies like the IMF and World Bank would restructure and reduce the debt owed to
commercial banks by least developed countries that had pursued structural adjustments and
economic reforms. See id. The developing countries issued Brady bonds in order to
restructure their defaulted commercial bank debt. See id. The banks would exchange the
nonperforming loans with U.S. dollar-denominated bonds. See id. The debtor country would
have to undergo a number of economic reforms before the restructuring would be approved.
See id. Once Brady bonds were issued, they could be traded in secondary markets. See id. at
141.
166. See Wheeler & Attaran, supra note 134, at 256–57.
167. Elliott Assocs., L.P. v. Banco de la Nacion, 194 F.3d 363, 378 (2d Cir. 1999).
168. See Bradley, Cox & Gulati, supra note 129, at 292.
169. See Elliott Assocs. v. De la Nacion, 194 F.R.D. 116, 117 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
170. See Wheeler & Attaran, supra note 134, at 257.
171. See id.
172. See Bradley, Cox & Gulati, supra note 129, at 290.
173. See id. at 293.
174. See id.
175. See Cooper & Wayne, supra note 158; see also Bradley, Cox & Gulati, supra note
129, at 290.
176. See Bradley, Cox & Gulati, supra note 129, at 293.
177. See id.
178. Pari Passu means “[p]roportionally; at an equal pace; without preference.” BLACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 10, at 1225. In the context of sovereign debt instruments, the
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sovereign bond issues.179 Creditors could now invoke the pari passu clause
as a way to hold up sovereign debt restructurings.180
The Elliott ruling solidified creditors’ holdout power, thereby injecting
new risk into these securities.181 Elliott increased the risk of holdout
litigation due to the ubiquity of the pari passu clause.182 There was also a
risk that hedge funds would begin searching for additional techniques for
successfully litigating holdout suits.183 Elliott is now utilizing similar
tactics in its efforts to collect on defaulted Argentine bonds.184
E. The Global Community Responds
Part I.E.1 details the IMF’s failed proposal to create a mechanism for
controlling sovereign bond restructurings. Next, Part I.E.2 looks at the
international community’s preferred solution: collective action clauses.
Lastly, Part I.E.3 details some of the collective action clauses’
shortcomings.
1. A Rejected Proposal: The Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism
In 2001, the deputy director of the IMF, Anne Krueger, cited vulture
funds as a major cause of the disorderly state of sovereign bond
restructurings.185 Krueger explicitly referenced Elliott Associates five
times in her speech.186 She sought a way to encourage debtors and
creditors to collaborate and restructure unsustainable debts efficiently.187
This led Krueger to lobby the IMF to create a formal mechanism—which
became known as the Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism (SDRM)—
to control debt restructurings.188
The SDRM envisioned what would have been a formal mechanism with
four key features.189 First, the mechanism would prevent creditors from

pari passu clause is typically understood as a contract provision that prevents the borrower
from incurring debt obligations to other creditors and ranking them legally senior to the debt
instrument containing the clause. See Lee C. Buchheit & Jeremiah S. Pam, The Pari Passu
Clause in Sovereign Debt Instruments, 53 EMORY L.J. 869, 872 (2004); see also Joseph J.
Norton, International Syndicated Lending: The Legal Context for Economic Development in
Latin America, NAFTA L. & BUS. REV. AM., Summer 1996, at 21, 54 (“The pari passu
clause prevents the borrower from assuming new debts which subordinate the interests of the
syndicate members.”).
179. See Bradley, Cox & Gulati, supra note 129, at 293.
180. See id. at 294.
181. See id.; see also Seveg, supra note 78, at 52–53 (“Most importantly, Elliott’s success
shows that it is possible for a vulture fund to successfully seize the assets of a sovereign
debtor thereby undermining a sovereign’s debt restructuring efforts.”).
182. See Bradley, Cox & Gulati, supra note 129, at 293.
183. See id. at 294.
184. See supra notes 1–9 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 280–333, and
accompanying text.
185. See Krueger, supra note 86.
186. See id.
187. See id.; see also Arora & Caminal, supra note 26, at 633.
188. See Krueger, supra note 86; see also Arora & Caminal, supra note 26, at 633.
189. See Krueger, supra note 86; see also Arora & Caminal, supra note 26, at 633–34.
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disrupting restructuring negotiations by pursuing holdout litigation.190
Second, it would give creditors some guarantee that the sovereign debtor
would adopt appropriate economic policies, negotiate in good faith with
creditors, and refrain from giving preferential treatment to some
creditors.191 Third, in an effort to encourage private lenders to provide new
funds to help the sovereign meet its financial needs, the mechanism would
provide new creditors with some type of preferred creditor status,
guaranteeing their repayment before existing private creditors.192 Lastly,
the mechanism would make a restructuring binding on minority creditors
once a large enough majority of creditors accepted the restructuring
agreement.193
Krueger believed the mere presence of the SDRM would encourage
debtors and creditors to negotiate on their own and reach restructuring
agreements without actually utilizing the mechanism.194 If holdout
creditors frustrated a restructuring agreement, the formal mechanism could
be used to bind the potential holdout creditors to the majority’s decision.195
However, the SDRM was never created due, in large part, to the United
States’s disapproval.196
In April 2003, U.S. Treasury Secretary John W. Snow proclaimed that it
was “neither necessary nor feasible to continue working on the SDRM.”197
The SDRM proposal received further criticism from creditors worried about
tilting the balance of power in the borrowers’ direction.198 The United
States favored a more market-driven solution and urged contractual reform
as an alternative to the SDRM.199 Eventually, the United States,200 the
IMF,201 and the Group of 10 (G-10)202 supported a complete transition from
190. See Krueger, supra note 86; see also Arora & Caminal, supra note 26, at 633–34.
191. See Krueger, supra note 86; see also Arora & Caminal, supra note 26, at 634.
192. See Krueger, supra note 86; see also Arora & Caminal, supra note 26, at 634.
193. See Krueger, supra note 86; see also Arora & Caminal, supra note 26, at 634.
194. See Krueger, supra note 86.
195. See id.; see also Arora & Caminal, supra note 26, at 634.
196. See John W. Snow, U.S. Sec’y of the Treasury, Statement at the Meeting of the
International Monetary and Financial Committee (Apr. 12, 2003), available at
http://www.imf.org/external/spring/2003/imfc/state/eng/usa.htm.
197. Id.
198. See Anna Gelpern, What Iraq and Argentina Might Learn from Each Other, 6 CHI. J.
INT’L L. 391, 398 (2005).
199. See Bradley, Cox & Gulati, supra note 129, at 296–97 n.9.
200. See Robert B. Ahdieh, Between Mandate and Market: Contract Transition in the
Shadow of the International Order, 53 EMORY L. J. 691, 707–08 (2004).
201. See Communiqué of the International Monetary and Financial Committee of the
Board of Governors of the International Monetary Fund, INT’L MONETARY FUND (Sept. 21,
2003), http://www.imf.org/external/np/cm/2003/092103a.htm.
202. See GRP. OF TEN, WORKING GRP. ON CONTRACTUAL CLAUSES, REPORT OF THE G-10
WORKING GROUP ON CONTRACTUAL CLAUSES 3–6 (2003), available at http://www.bis.org/
publ/gten08.pdf. The “Group of Ten” is “the group of countries that have agreed to
participate in the [IMF’s] General Arrangements to Borrow (GAB), a supplementary
borrowing arrangement that can be invoked if the IMF’s resources are estimated to be below
member’s needs.” INT’L MONETARY FUND, A GUIDE TO COMMITTEES, GROUPS, AND CLUBS 4
(2013), available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/pdf/groups.pdf. The G-10
members are: Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden,
Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Id.
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unanimous action clauses to collective action clauses (CACs) in sovereign
financing contracts.203
2. Heralding a Savior: Collective Action Clauses
English law bonds have utilized some form of CACs for more than a
century.204 However, CACs were not used under New York law until
2003.205 In February 2003, Mexico issued the first sovereign bonds in the
New York market that included CACs.206 Since then, the use of CACs in
New York bonds has become standard practice.207
Shocks to the sovereign debt market—including Mexico’s financial crisis
in 1995, the Asian crisis in 1997–98, and Argentina’s 2001 default—are
believed to have triggered the use of CACs in sovereign bonds issued on the
The jump from UACs to CACs was not
New York market.208
instantaneous.209 Rather, there was a shift in the boilerplate sovereign bond
contract resulting from competition among market participants.210
Contracts, including sovereign bond contracts, are documents produced
by law firms that serve large numbers of clients with a variety of interests
and needs.211 As a result, many contracts are modifications of existing
templates.212 Industry-wide change in contracts generally occurs in
response to major events, like the financial crises in the late 1990s.213
Immediately after Mexico’s crisis in 1995, CACs were used infrequently
and only by more marginal market participants.214 Eventually, the
cumulative effect of the crises led top-market participants to adopt CACs
and to compete over CAC-related terms in an effort to control the eventual
CAC standard.215
There are two broad categories of CACs.216 The first type of CAC is a
majority restructuring provision.217 Majority restructuring provisions allow
a specific majority of bondholders of a particular issuance to alter the
bonds’ financial terms—principal, interest, and maturity—and bind all
other holders of that issuance by the alteration.218 The second type of CAC
is a majority enforcement provision.219 A majority enforcement provision
203. See Arora & Caminal, supra note 26, at 632.
204. See Das, Papaioannou & Trebesch, supra note 30, at 44.
205. See id.
206. See id.; see also Choi, Gulati & Posner, supra note 131, at 4.
207. See Das, Papaioannou & Trebesch, supra note 30, at 44; see also Choi, Gulati &
Posner, supra note 131, at 4.
208. See Choi, Gulati & Posner, supra note 131, at 4.
209. See id.
210. See id.
211. See id. at 6.
212. See id. at 4.
213. See id.
214. See id.
215. See id.; see also Arora & Caminal, supra note 26, at 651.
216. See Das, Papaioannou & Trebesch, supra note 30, at 43.
217. See id.
218. See id.
219. See id.
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enables a qualified majority of bondholders to prevent individual
bondholders from accelerating payment and from commencing litigation
against the sovereign.220
CACs make restructuring easier for the sovereign to execute, while
simultaneously giving bondholders substantial control over the process.221
This helps to ensure that countries cannot use the restructuring clauses to
escape their debt obligations when they are capable of repaying.222 Still,
the presence of CACs does not necessarily guarantee an efficient
restructuring.223
3. Underwhelming Success: A Few of the Lingering Problems
Part I.E.3.i to Part I.E.3.ii discusses two broad restructuring problems
that remain, despite the market shift towards the ubiquitous inclusion of
CACs in sovereign bond contracts.
i. Coordination Issues
The dominance of bond lending in sovereign debt has created
coordination problems for sovereigns due to the increase in the number of
creditors with whom the sovereign must negotiate in the event of a
restructuring.224 There are significantly more bondholders involved with
bond issues than there were bank participants when bank lending was the
dominant form of sovereign debt.225 There are also more bondholders now
than in the past eras in which bonds were the dominant form of sovereign
debt.226 Moreover, large banks maintained ongoing relationships with
sovereigns, which created an expectation of future lending arrangements.227
This expectation gave lenders an incentive to compromise during debt
restructurings.228 In contrast, bondholders do not have the same incentive
to compromise, because they typically do not have an expectation of an
ongoing relationship with the sovereign.229
In terms of logistics, restructuring bond debt is challenging because of
the number of agreements—stemming from both the multiple issues of
bonds as well as individual agreements with bondholders subject to
UACs—a sovereign must reach.230 Coordination problems have become
increasingly difficult due to the bondholders’ dispersion and the expansion
220. See id.
221. See Choi, Gulati & Posner, supra note 56, at 159–60.
222. See id.; see also supra notes 102–10 and accompanying text.
223. See Das, Papaioannou & Trebesch, supra note 30, at 45.
224. See Dickerson, supra note 41, at 1012; see also Seveg, supra note 78, at 46.
225. See Dickerson, supra note 41, at 1012.
226. See supra notes 41–45 and accompanying text.
227. See Anna Gelpern, How Collective Action Is Changing Sovereign Debt, 22 INT’L
FIN. L. REV. 19, 19 (2003).
228. See RIEFFEL, supra note 141, at 111 (“The driving motivation for most banks . . .
was the desire to continue doing business with the debtor country.”).
229. See Schwarcz, supra note 79, at 1005 n.285.
230. See id. at 1004–05.
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of the bond market.231 There is also a high turnover of bondholders due to
purchase and sale of bonds on the secondary market, which results in the
added cost of having to locate and contact the new owners before
negotiation can begin.232 A small country may only have one or two bond
issues, so the coordination problem is relatively manageable.233 However,
the coordination problem is far more complex for a larger country with
upwards of one hundred bond issues and various forms of debt.234
CACs have been unable to remedy the coordination problem.235 Some
experts believe another method—which is yet undiscovered—must be
combined with CACs to encourage coordination among creditors.236
Publicly issued corporate bonds face collective action and coordination
Scholars have
problems similar to those of sovereign bonds.237
recommended a new governance structure in the publicly issued corporate
bond context that includes the creation of a “supertrustee” charged with
monitoring, renegotiating, and enforcing bond covenants.238 By vesting
exclusive authority to renegotiate and enforce bond covenants in the
supertrustee, this alternative governance structure weakens the procedural
rights of bondholders.239 The rationale behind such a structure may be
equally applicable in the sovereign bond context.
Like sovereign bonds, public corporate bonds are typically dispersed
among a large number of bondholders.240 Each bondholder owns a small
fraction of the company’s bonds, so they may not have an incentive to
obtain the relevant information about the company necessary to monitor its
compliance with bond covenants, or to assess the types of enforcement
action that should be taken in the event a covenant is breached.241
Correspondingly, companies face increased costs while obtaining consent
from the dispersed bondholders.242

231. See John B. Taylor, Under Sec’y of Treasury for Int’l Affairs, Using Clauses To
Reform the Process for Sovereign Debt Workouts: Progress and Next Steps (Dec. 5, 2002),
available at http://www.stanford.edu/~johntayl/taylorspeeches/Using%20Clauses%20to
%20Reform%20the%20Process%20for%20Sovereign%20Debt%20Workouts%20(5%20De
c%20%2002).doc.
232. See Schwarcz, supra note 79, at 1004–05.
233. See Adam Brenneman, Gone Broke: Sovereign Debt, Personal Bankruptcy, and a
Comprehensive Contractual Solution, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 649, 682 (2006).
234. See Fisch & Gentile, supra note 49, at 1094 (noting Argentina had 152 different
bond issues).
235. See Arora & Caminal, supra note 26, at 647.
236. See id.; see also Lee C. Buchheit & G. Mitu Gulati, Sovereign Bonds and the
Collective Will 22 (Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr., Georgetown-Sloan Project on Bus. Insts.,
Working Paper No. 34, 2002), available at http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/
Documents/events/conf0207/buchheit_gulati.pdf.
237. See Yakov Amihud, Kenneth Garbade & Marcel Kahan, A New Governance
Structure for Corporate Bonds, 51 STAN. L. REV. 447, 450–51 (1999).
238. See id. at 451. The proposed supertrustees would be compensated through an annual
fee from the bond issue. See Amihud, Garbade & Kahan, supra note 237, at 473.
239. See id.
240. See id. at 459.
241. See id.
242. See id. at 459–60.
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The supertrustee governance structure was proposed to lower agency
costs while retaining liquidity in the public bond market.243 The
supertrustee would act as an agent of bondholders, but would differ from a
traditional indenture trustee244 in that the supertrustee would have the
authority and incentives to execute the functions of active monitoring,
Companies would select the
enforcement, and renegotiation.245
supertrustee before issuing the bonds and would have no right to replace the
supertrustee once the bonds were issued.246 Bondholders would only have
a limited right to replace the supertrustee.247 This structure was grounded
in the belief that the supertrustee’s reputation and potential to represent
bondholders effectively would impact the price of the bonds.248
Bondholders would pay less for bonds with an unreliable supertrustee, the
same way that they pay less for bonds with contract terms that provide
unsatisfactory protection.249
The supertrustee would be given access to, and would utilize, the same
information about the company that lenders in the private market have:
reports submitted by accountants, nonpublic financial data, inspection
rights, and compliance certificates detailing whether bond covenants have
been breached.250 The supertrustee would be required to monitor the
company with the same intensity as a reasonable lender in the private
market under similar circumstances.251 This standard would serve as a
commercially practicable benchmark for evaluating whether a supertrustee
has met its obligations.252
Supertrustees may be given the authority to renegotiate core financial
terms—such as interest rate reductions and principal forgiveness. Even
without such authority, however, a supertrustee can play an invaluable role
in the restructuring process.253 The supertrustee’s past monitoring will
impart substantial knowledge about the company and will position the
supertrustee to evaluate the merits of a proposed restructuring.254 As such,
the supertrustee can act as an adviser to and representative for bondholders,
even if the bondholders must ultimately consent to any changes to core
financial terms that result from a restructuring.255
Some sovereign bonds have included trustee structures within the bond
contracts; however, these sovereign bond trustees were given far less power

243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.

See id. at 469.
See supra notes 53–55 and accompanying text.
See Amihud, Garbade & Kahan, supra note 237, at 470.
See id. at 471.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 472.
See id. at 473.
See id.
See id. at 475–76.
Id. at 476.
See id.
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than the supertrustee proposed in the corporate bond context.256 For
example, Uruguay included a weak trustee structure to provide bondholders
with a centralized figure that could initiate collective legal actions, as well
as distribute any resulting legal award.257 Some experts believe that
holdout litigation may be curbed by combining CACs with some type of
trust structure.258 The sovereign bond trustees that have been contemplated
by debtor nations thus far have typically been geared towards directly
controlling litigation arising from restructurings, rather than preventing
litigation from arising in the first place.259
ii. A Lack of Aggregation
The coordination problems that arise from a high number of bondholders,
combined with multiple series of bonds, may be curbed through the use of
Aggregation enables a supermajority of
aggregation clauses.260
bondholders during a debt restructuring to force the agreed upon
modification of certain matters across multiple series of bonds.261 Without
aggregation, an issuer must receive approval of a restructuring plan from a
threshold percentage of bondholders in each individual bond series.262 This
can lead to restructuring problems both among bondholders within the same
class, as well as among bondholders across the various bond series.263
As the number of bond series increases, the restructuring process
becomes more complex.264 Further complications arise when there are
different modification provisions governing the various series of bonds.265
These circumstances force a sovereign to renegotiate identical terms across
multiple bond series, which can make the restructuring process exceedingly
inefficient.266 Without aggregation, a group of holdout bondholders within
a single bond series can delay or even halt an otherwise successful
restructuring that spans multiple bond issues.267

256. See, e.g., República Oriental del Uruguay, Prospectus Supplement to Prospectus
Dated June 20, 2008 (Form 424B3), at S-20 to S-21 (Dec. 5, 2011), available at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/102385/000119312511329610/d265523d424b3
.htm; see also Sergio J. Galvis & Angel L. Saad, Collective Action Clauses: Recent
Progress and Challenges Ahead, 35 GEO. J. INT’L L. 713, 722 (2004).
257. República Oriental del Uruguay, supra note 256.
258. See Das, Papaioannou & Trebesch, supra note 30, at 43–44.
259. See id.
260. See Galvis & Saad, supra note 256, at 722.
261. See id. at 715.
262. See id.
263. See id. at 722.
264. See David A. Skeel, Jr., Can Majority Voting Provisions Do It All?, 52 EMORY L.J.
417, 422–23 (2003).
265. For example, this might occur if one series of bonds is governed by CACs and
another series has incorporated UACs. See id.
266. See Barry Eichengreen & Ashoka Mody, Is Aggregation a Problem for Sovereign
Debt Restructuring? 1 (Jan. 2003) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://idbdocs.iadb
.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=801485.
267. See Fisch & Gentile, supra note 49, at 1098.
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Aggregation clauses allow a sovereign issuer to focus the restructuring
on areas of collective agreement across multiple bond series.268 Similarly,
the threat of “cramdown”269 aggregation may encourage bondholders from
different series to collaborate and arrive at a settlement that is mutually
advantageous.270 The highly liquid secondary market offers bondholders
the freedom to avoid what they may view as inequitable concessions
through the sale of their bonds in the open market.271
Uruguay was the first sovereign to incorporate aggregation mechanisms
in its bonds contracts.272 The bonds included clauses that permitted the
modification of certain matters across multiple series of bonds.273 Under
these clauses, Uruguay would be required to obtain the support of holders
of “at least 85% in the outstanding-principle amount of all affected series in
the aggregate and at least two-thirds of each affected series individually.”274
Uruguay alleviated investor concerns about the potential issuance of
“sham” bonds in order to attain the requisite 85 percent aggregate
threshold.275 It did so by including a provision in its bonds prohibiting the
issuance of additional bonds “with the intention of placing such debt
securities with holders expected to support any modification proposed by
Uruguay (or that Uruguay plans to propose).”276
F. How It All Plays Out, or, Don’t Cry for Me: Argentina
Since the resurgence of the sovereign bond market in the early 1990s,277
there have been more than fourteen defaults followed by restructurings.278
The first instance was Pakistan in 1999, and the most recent was Greece in
2011, whose restructuring continues to date.279 Part I.F details Argentina’s
2001 default to highlight some of the main obstacles a sovereign may face
when attempting to restructure its debt following a default.
In 2001, Argentina defaulted on its international bonds—the largest
sovereign debt default in history.280 In the ten years leading up to its
default, Argentina had issued 179 bonds in international capital markets,

268. See id. at 1044.
269. “Cramdown” is defined as “[c]ourt confirmation of a Chapter 11 Bankruptcy plan
despite the opposition of certain creditors.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 10, at
423. In the sovereign bond context, cramdown refers to forced adhesion to negotiated terms.
See Galvis & Saad, supra note 256, at 722.
270. See Fisch & Gentile, supra note 49, at 1090–95.
271. See id.
272. See Arora & Caminal, supra note 26, at 663–64.
273. See Galvis & Saad, supra note 256, at 722.
274. Id.
275. See id.
276. República Oriental del Uruguay, supra note 256, at S-9.
277. See supra notes 41–44 and accompanying text.
278. See Choi, Gulati & Posner, supra note 56, at 173.
279. See id.
280. See Gelpern, supra note 198, at 407; see also Ross P. Buckley, Why Are Developing
Nations So Slow To Play the Default Card in Renegotiating Their Sovereign Indebtedness?,
6 CHI. J. INT’L L. 345, 350 (2005).
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raising a total of USD 139.4 billion.281 These bonds were being held by
roughly 500,000 separate bondholders.282 By the late 1990s, it became
clear that Argentina was facing a severe economic recession.283
Between 2000 and 2001, Argentina had three different presidents and had
depegged its currency—the peso—from the dollar.284 Over the next six
months, the peso lost roughly three-quarters of its value, the Central Bank
reserves were halved, and the Argentine people took to the streets in
protest.285 On December 23, 2001, Argentina defaulted on its debt when it
publicly announced the deferral of over USD 100 billion owed to domestic
and foreign creditors.286 By the end of 2002, Argentina’s public debt
burden of approximately USD 137 billion represented 130 percent of its
GDP.287
In September 2003, the IMF agreed to a USD 12.5 billon, three-year
credit package.288 Shortly thereafter, on September 22, 2003, Argentina
presented its initial debt restructuring strategy called the Dubai Proposal.289
Argentina’s proposal was essentially a unilateral exchange offer.290
Unilateral exchange offers occur when sovereigns bypass negotiations with
their creditors and design new bonds aimed towards appealing to the market
while simultaneously awarding themselves a degree of debt relief.291 The
amount of debt relief that should be awarded through the terms of the
exchange-offer bonds is typically determined by the sovereign and the
official sector—the IMF and World Bank.292
On January 12, 2004, the Global Committee of Argentina Bondholders
(GCAB) was founded in Rome.293 It was comprised of major bondholder
groups representing more than half a million retail investors and numerous
financial institutions, holding a total of approximately USD 37 billion in
nominal value Argentine bonds.294 The GCAB’s aim was to improve
coordination of the members’ efforts to negotiate with Argentina, while
attempting to reach a fair and efficient restructuring of the Argentine
debt.295 Argentina held discussions with creditor groups, like the GCAB, to
negotiate the restructuring.296 However, Argentina largely rejected the
negotiations and proceeded towards the unilateral exchange.297
281. See Abaclat, supra note 110, ¶ 50.
282. See Buckley, supra note 280, at 351.
283. Id.
284. See Gelpern, supra note 198, at 407; see also Buckley, supra note 280, at 351.
285. See Gelpern, supra note 198, at 407; see also Buckley, supra note 280, at 351.
286. See Abaclat, supra note 110, ¶ 58.
287. See id. ¶ 63.
288. See id. ¶ 70.
289. See id. ¶ 71.
290. See Mark B. Richards, The Republic of Congo’s Debt Restructuring: Are Sovereign
Creditors Getting Their Voice Back?, 73 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 273, 281 (2010).
291. See id. at 274.
292. See id.
293. See Abaclat, supra note 110, ¶ 72; see also Richards, supra note 290, at 282.
294. See Abaclat, supra note 110, ¶ 72; see also Richards, supra note 290, at 282.
295. See Richards, supra note 290, at 282.
296. See Abaclat, supra note 110, ¶ 74.
297. See Richards, supra note 290, at 282.
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On January 14, 2005, Argentina launched Exchange Offer 2005.298
Under the exchange offer, bondholders could exchange 152 different bond
series—which Argentina had suspended payment on in 2001—for newly
issued Argentine debt instruments.299 The exchange offer provided
bondholders with three options from which to choose for the structure of
their new bonds: (1) par bonds with the same principal but a lower interest
rate, (2) discount bonds with reduced principal but a higher interest rate, or
(3) quasi-par bonds with a principal and interest rate falling between the
two other options.300 This offer was a one-time bond-exchange option on a
take-it-or-leave-it basis.301 Participating bondholders received a 67 percent
haircut302 in the exchange.303 Approximately 76 percent of all debt
holdings participated in Exchange Offer 2005.304 Argentina had managed
to restructure approximately USD 62 billion.305
A number of creditors were unsatisfied with the terms and conditions of
the exchange and initiated litigation proceedings.306 This included several
vulture funds.307 A total of 158 suits have been filed in the United States
alone as a result of Exchange Offer 2005.308 In addition, a number of
holdout creditors filed claims with the International Center for the
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), claiming the Argentine
restructuring equated to expropriation.309
Argentina still faced a significant debt load, despite the relatively high
participation rate in the 2005 exchange.310 On May 3, 2010, Argentina
launched Exchange Offer 2010, aimed at restructuring and canceling
defaulted debt obligations dating back to its 2001 default.311 The exchange
was for USD 18 billion of Argentine debt and offered creditors a 75 percent
haircut.312 Sixty-six percent of the targeted bondholders participated,
accounting for USD 12.1 billion of the outstanding debt.313 To date, USD
298. See Abaclat, supra note 110, ¶ 77.
299. See id.
300. See id.
301. See U.N. Conference on Trade & Dev., Sovereign Debt Restructuring and
International Investment Agreements, at 3 (July 2011), http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/
webdiaepcb2011d3_en.pdf.
302. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
303. See U.N. Conference on Trade & Dev., supra note 301, at 3.
304. See NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Arg., 699 F.3d 246, 252 (2d Cir. 2012), cert.
denied, No. 12-1494, 2013 WL 3211846 (U.S. Oct. 7, 2013); Abaclat, supra note 110, ¶ 80.
305. See NML Capital, 699 F.3d at 252; U.N. Conference on Trade & Dev., supra note
301, at 3.
306. See Abaclat, supra note 110, ¶ 82.
307. See U.N. Conference on Trade & Dev., supra note 301, at 3.
308. Id.; see, e.g., H.W. Urban GmbH v. Republic of Arg., No. 02 Civ. 5699 (TPG), 2006
WL 587333, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 9, 2006) (granting summary judgment as to Argentina’s
liability to a class of bondholders, but denying a motion for full payment of principal and
interest due on Argentine bonds); see also NML Capital, 699 F.3d 246.
309. See U.N. Conference on Trade & Dev., supra note 301, at 3; see also, e.g., Abaclat,
supra note 110.
310. See U.N. Conference on Trade & Dev., supra note 301, at 3.
311. See NML Capital, 699 F.3d at 252–53; Abaclat, supra note 110, ¶ 93.
312. See U.N. Conference on Trade & Dev., supra note 301, at 3.
313. See id.
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6.2 billion worth of bondholders continue to litigate in domestic courts as
well as through ICSID.314
On October 26, 2012, Elliott Associates’ subsidiary, NML Capital,
received a favorable ruling in its case against Argentina in the Second
Circuit.315 The court held that Argentina was barred from discriminating
against the bonds of groups like NML Capital in favor of bonds issued in
Argentina’s 2005 and 2010 exchanges.316 The Second Circuit affirmed the
judgment of the Southern District of New York, granting permanent
injunctions designed to prevent Argentina from making payments on the
2005 and 2010 debt instruments without making comparable payments on
the defaulted debt.317 This was a sizable victory for the plaintiffs, as their
collective unpaid principal and interest amounted to approximately USD
1.33 billion.318 Argentina has since petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for a
writ of certiorari.319
NML Capital based its claim against Argentina on the pari passu
clause,320 the same tactic Elliott used in its litigation against Peru in the
1990s.321 The court held that Argentina breached the pari passu clause of
the bond contract because it ranked payment obligations to the 2005 and
2010 exchange bondholders above payments to the plaintiffs when it
refused to pay on the defaulted bonds.322 Moreover, the Second Circuit
affirmed the district court’s finding that, despite the financial crisis in the
early 2000s, Argentina could now make payments to both the holdout
creditors and the exchange bondholders.323 Ultimately, the Second Circuit
remanded to the district court to clarify how the injunction against
Argentina would operate.324
In response to the Second Circuit’s October 26, 2012 ruling, Argentina’s
President, Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, declared, “We will not surrender
money at the cost of hunger and exclusion for millions of Argentines.”325
314. See id.
315. See NML Capital, 699 F.3d at 250; see also NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Arg.,
Nos. 12-4694, 12-4865, 2013 WL 4487563, at *11 (2d Cir. Aug. 23, 2013) (affirming the
district court’s orders but holding “[e]nforcement of the amended injunctions shall be stayed
pending the resolution by the Supreme Court of a timely petition for a writ of certiorari”);
see also Gelpern, supra note 9.
316. See NML Capital, 699 F.3d at 250; see also Gelpern, supra note 9.
317. See NML Capital, 699 F.3d at 250; see also NML Capital, 2013 WL 4487563, at
*11.
318. See NML Capital, 699 F.3d at 251.
319. See NML Capital, 2013 WL 4487563, at *1.
320. See NML Capital, 699 F.3d at 251.
321. See supra notes 163–71 and accompanying text.
322. See NML Capital, 699 F.3d at 259–60 (“The record amply supports a finding that
Argentina effectively has ranked its payment obligations to the plaintiffs below those of the
exchange bondholders.”).
323. Id. at 263 (“The district court found that the Republic had sufficient funds, including
over $40 billion in foreign currency reserves, to pay plaintiffs the judgments they are due.”).
324. See id. at 255.
325. See Heather Stewart & Uki Goñi, Argentina Fears Default After American Court
Ruling, GUARDIAN (Nov. 22, 2012, 2:43 PM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/nov/22
/american-ruling-fears-default-argentina; see also NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Arg.,
No. 08 Civ. 6978 (TPG), 2012 WL 5895650, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 21, 2012) (noting
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This prompted the district court, on remand, to vacate a prior stay of
enforcement,326 thereby making the Second Circuit’s injunction applicable
to interest payments made to exchange bondholders in December 2012.327
The district court also clarified the specific terms of the injunction, in
accordance with the Second Circuit’s instructions.328
According to the injunction, if and when Argentina makes an interest
payment on the exchange bonds, it will be required to make a payment to
the holdout creditors.329
Specifically, if Argentina pays exchange
bondholders 100 percent of what they are owed, it will be required to pay
100 percent of the total amount currently due to the holdout creditors.330
The court found the amount currently due to holdout creditors to be the
amount of unpaid principal plus accrued interest: approximately USD 1.33
billion.331 The court ordered Argentina to put the USD 1.33 billion into
escrow, and prohibited banks and other third parties from intervening on
Argentina’s behalf.332
Argentina subsequently appealed to the Second Circuit with the hope that
the court would reverse the order for payment.333 On August 23, 2013, the
Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s orders but stayed enforcement
of the amended injunctions pending the Supreme Court’s resolution of
Argentina’s petition for a writ of certiorari.334
II. AN INSUFFICIENT SOLUTION: COLLECTIVE ACTION CLAUSES ARE NOT
ALL THEY’RE CRACKED UP TO BE
Part II of this Note discusses the problems with restructurings that CACs
have been unable to address. Sovereign bond contracts must strike a
President Cristina Kirchner made statements regarding Argentina’s refusal to pay holders of
the original bonds).
326. See NML Capital, 2012 WL 5895650, at *1–2 (“From the moment of the October
26, 2012 Court of Appeals’ decision, the highest officials in Argentina have declared that
Argentina would pay the exchange bondholders but would not pay one dollar to holders of
the original . . . [b]onds. . . . It is the view of the District Court that these threats of defiance
cannot go by unheeded, and that action is called for. . . . Therefore, the provision in the
March 5, 2012 Order staying the carrying out of the February 23, 2012 Order is vacated and
it is directed that the February 23, 2012 Order, as now somewhat modified, is to be carried
out forthwith.”).
327. See id. at *1–2.
328. See id.; see also Judge Orders Argentina To Pay Holdout Investors, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 23, 2012, at B6.
329. See NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Arg., Nos. 08 Civ. 6978(TPG), 09 Civ. 1707
(TPG), 09 Civ. 1708(TPG), 2012 WL 5895786, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 21, 2012).
330. See id.
331. See id.
332. See NML Capital, 2012 WL 5895650, at *2 (“Since the Court of Appeals has not
finally spoken on the subject of the calculation of the payment to plaintiffs, such payment is
to be made into an escrow account, so that any adjustments required by the final Court of
Appeals’ ruling can be made.”); see also Judge Orders Argentina To Pay Holdout Investors,
supra note 328; Argy-Bargy, supra note 2, at 80.
333. See Argentina Asks US Court To Revert Order To Pay Debt Holdout Creditors,
FOXNEWS.COM (Dec. 29, 2012), http://www.foxnews.com/world/2012/12/29/argentinaasks-us-court-to-revert-order-to-pay-debt-holdout-creditors/.
334. NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Arg., 727 F.3d 230 (2d Cir. 2013).
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balance that protects the interests of both creditors and debtors.335 While it
is true that creditors can rarely seize a sovereign’s assets to repay defaulted
debts,336 creditors have had some success litigating contract claims in
courts.337 If investors are using bond contracts as a way of reducing the
risk of investing in sovereigns, then bond contract terms may be directly
related to the ability of investors to collect from sovereigns in the event of a
default.338
Some studies have found a correlation between a sovereign’s perceived
riskiness and the contractual terms investors are willing to consent to.339
When investors regard a country as virtually riskless, they are willing to
consent to contracts that specify the interest rate and maturity, but do not
incorporate other terms that limit the country’s ability to manage its debt.340
In contrast, when investors believe a country is risky, they typically require
additional contractual terms aimed at increasing the probability of payment,
managing restructuring, and preventing opportunistic behavior on the part
of the sovereign.341
CACs were embedded in some of the bonds involved in Argentina’s
2005 exchange, but the clause was unable to prevent the holdout problem
Argentina continues to face years after its 2005 and 2010 restructurings.342
Experts have begun to doubt the usefulness of CACs.343 The CAC was
supposed to provide a mechanism that would enable markets to deal with
the holdout problem.344 However, the market does not appear to attach
much positive value to the use of CACs.345
There is little indication that including CACs in sovereign bond contracts
has a significant effect on borrowing costs.346 The impact that CACs have
on borrowings costs should be dependent on the details and the design of
the particular clause.347 A CAC that reduces creditor rights is more likely
to have an effect on the bond’s price.348 That CACs have not had an effect

335. See Choi, Gulati & Posner, supra note 56, at 133 (“Sovereign debt contracts must
balance several goals: encouraging sovereigns to repay in the good state; enabling valueincreasing restructurings in bad states; preventing debtors from seeking to exploit divisions
among creditors in order to opportunistically reduce their debt burden; and preventing
debtors from taking risks in order to externalize the cost of default on creditors.”).
336. See supra notes 64–68 and accompanying text.
337. See supra notes 159–84 and accompanying text; see also Choi, Gulati & Posner,
supra note 56, at 133.
338. See Choi, Gulati & Posner, supra note 56, at 175.
339. See id.
340. See id.
341. See id.
342. See Das, Papaioannou & Trebesch, supra note 30, at 45.
343. See, e.g., Anna Gelpern & Mitu Gulati, Sovereign Snake Oil (Am. Univ. Wash. Coll.
of Law, Research Paper No. 2011-05, 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1732650; see also supra notes 235–36, and accompanying text.
344. See Bradley, Cox & Gulati, supra note 129, at 320.
345. See id.
346. See Das, Papaioannou & Trebesch, supra note 30, at 45.
347. See id.
348. See id.
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on prices may suggest that market participants do not find CACs to be an
effective restructuring tool.349
Many experts view the current market-based restructuring regime—
CACs—as “disorderly, inefficient, and overly costly.”350 Part II.A looks at
the empirical evidence which suggests countries often delay in calling
restructurings. Part II.B then turns to the fact that, once called,
restructurings are often a lengthy process. Next, Part II.C examines the
tendency for restructurings to be followed by extensive disputes. Finally,
Part II.D lays out the additional challenges that a new contractual
mechanism must address in order to improve sovereign bond restructurings.
A. Countries Stall When Prompt Action Is Necessary
Studies suggest countries often delay in initiating a restructuring. On
average, sovereigns wait nine and a half months after their initial debt
distress before they initiate restructuring negotiations.351 This delay is
mainly the result of government decisions and political factors.352 These
political factors include leadership changes, cabinet reshuffles, and a
government’s refusal to repay debt incurred by earlier governments.353
However, the most common reasons for delays in initiating a restructuring
seem to be aggressive debt policies, like a unilateral moratorium on
repaying debt, as well as failed negotiations with the IMF.354 CACs only
come into effect after a restructuring has commenced, and therefore are
ineffective in combating the delays in initiating necessary restructurings.355
B. The Restructuring Process Can Still Take Too Long
The restructuring process can be lengthy, sometimes lasting over ten
years.356 The duration of a restructuring is defined as the period of time
beginning with either the month that the sovereign defaults or announces a
restructuring and ending with the final implementation of the deal.357
When a restructuring cannot be resolved within the first few years of
financial distress, it becomes increasingly less likely that the sovereign will
be able to exit its debt crisis.358 Sovereigns and creditors alike share a
common interest in preventing and resolving debt crises in an effort to
promote greater financial stability.359 It follows that they should be

349. See id.
350. See id. at 88.
351. See Christoph Trebesch, Delays in Sovereign Debt Restructurings 8 (July 2008)
(unpublished
manuscript),
http://www.cid.harvard.edu/Economia/papers/Rio%202008/
Trebesch%202.pdf.
352. See id.
353. See id. at 10.
354. See id. at 10–11.
355. See supra notes 165–70 and accompanying text.
356. See Das, Papaioannou & Trebesch, supra note 30, at 26.
357. See Trebesch, supra note 351, at 6.
358. See id.
359. See Arora & Caminal, supra note 26, at 647–48.
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interested in expediting the restructuring process.360 On average, bond
restructurings in the post-Brady361 era have been completed in
approximately thirteen months.362 This average does not reflect the
significant disparity in restructuring duration.363
In 2004, Uruguay was able to restructure its sovereign bonds in less than
one month.364 CACs were partly included in the original bonds exchanged
and were utilized in Uruguay’s exchange.365 Yet, when Dominica
restructured its bonds in 2004, the restructuring lasted fifteen months,
despite the presence and use of CACs in the exchange.366 Argentina’s 2005
exchange partially included CACs in the original bonds, yet they were not
utilized in the exchange, and the restructuring dragged on for years.367
C. The Possibility of Holdouts and Litigation Remains
Even after a successful restructuring, there are often a number of
holdouts and lawsuits filed. Between 1980 and 2010, a total of 109 cases
were filed against debtor governments in connection to a default on
sovereign bonds or loans.368 CACs have not been entirely effective in
combating the holdout problem and preventing post-restructuring
litigation.369 In fact, the opposite appears to be true. Post-restructuring
creditor litigation has become increasingly common and is “now widely
regarded as a main obstacle to sovereign debt restructurings.”370
Furthermore, the outcome of Argentina’s ongoing litigation with NML
Capital could have a drastic impact on the effectiveness and frequency of
creditor litigation.371
D. What the Sovereign Debt Market Needs from the Bond Contracts
The primary challenge for the sovereign debt market is reducing the debt
level for sovereigns only when it is politically impossible for the country to
repay the debt in full.372 However, this determination depends on a number
of intangible factors—for example, the state of the economy and the level
of trust enjoyed by the government—and as a result cannot be written into
the bond contracts.373 Therefore, there is no objective metric that can be
written into a contract to determine when a sovereign is truly unable to pay
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See id. at 648.
See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
See Trebesch, supra note 351, at 7.
See Das, Papaioannou & Trebesch, supra note 30, at 27.
See U.N. Conference on Trade & Dev., supra note 301, at 3.
See Das, Papaioannou & Trebesch, supra note 30, at 46.
See id. at 37, 47.
See id. at 27; supra notes 280–333 and accompanying text
See Das, Papaioannou & Trebesch, supra note 30, at 51.
See id. at 49.
Id. at 50.
See supra notes 314–33 and accompanying text.
See Choi, Gulati & Posner, supra note 56, at 134, 137.
See id. at 137.
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its debt.374 This means creditors have no objective means of telling
whether the government is threatening to default for opportunistic
reasons.375
Currently, CACs require bondholders to vote on whether to accept a
sovereign’s proposed modifications of bond contract terms.376 Yet, they
must do so without a genuine understanding of the motive underlying the
sovereign’s default.377 Because bondholders are dispersed and typically
only hold a fraction of the total debt at stake, they do not have the incentive
to monitor the sovereign debtor to the degree that would be necessary to
inform their votes.378 In addition, bondholders may have an incentive to
agree to a potentially opportunistic restructuring due to the risk of being
completely excluded from repayment.379
III. HAVE NO FEAR, SUPERTRUSTEE IS HERE: A NEW CLAUSE FOR
SOVEREIGN BOND CONTRACTS
Part III attempts to resolve the remaining issues that plague sovereign
bond restructurings by proposing the use of a new type of sovereign bond
contract clause. This clause will create a bond trustee with expansive
powers. A number of these powers are modeled after the proposed powers
for the supertrustee envisioned in the corporate bond context.380 Yakov
Amihud, Kenneth Garbade, and Marcel Kahan proposed the supertrustee as
a new type of governance structure for publicly issued corporate bonds.381
This Note proposes the application of a similar supertrustee structure in the
sovereign bond context.
Like its corporate bond counterpart, the sovereign bond supertrustee
would be charged with actively monitoring the debtor country as well as
renegotiating and enforcing its bond covenants.382 The supertrustee would
be selected by the sovereign before it issues its bonds.383 Once the bonds
are issued, the sovereign would have no right to replace the supertrustee.384
Rather, bondholders would have a limited right to replace the supertrustee
should the need arise.385 This is because the supertrustee would act as an
agent of bondholders and must have the authority and incentives to actively
monitor the sovereign in an objective manner.386 The supertrustee’s
reputation and effectiveness in representing the bondholders would most
likely impact the price of bonds, as bondholders would assign less value to
374.
375.
376.
377.
378.
379.
380.
381.
382.
383.
384.
385.
386.
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a bond with an unreliable supertrustee.387 The inclusion of a supertrustee
clause in sovereign bonds, and the use of a supertrustee once bonds are
issued, would help to address the monitoring, coordinating, and negotiating
issues that impede the sovereign debt restructuring process.388
In carrying out its monitoring duties, the supertrustee would utilize
accounting reports, nonpublic financial data, and other information about
the sovereign that market lenders typically access when investigating a
sovereign’s financial well-being.389 The supertrustee would be required to
monitor the sovereign with the same intensity as a reasonable lender.390
This would serve as the standard in assessing whether the supertrustee has
met its monitoring obligations.391 Simply having a supertrustee to monitor
the sovereign’s financial affairs would address a number of the current
challenges to restructuring.
First, having a supertrustee to monitor the sovereign would address the
current widespread lack of creditor monitoring.392 Rather than attempt to
force creditors to monitor the sovereign when they lack the incentive to do
so,393 the supertrustee clause assigns the task to the person or institution
acting as the bond’s supertrustee. This ensures that someone is monitoring
the sovereign and supervising the bondholder’s investment. Second, the
supertrustee’s attentive monitoring would make it more difficult, if not
impossible, for a sovereign to engage in an opportunistic restructuring.394
While it is true that a sovereign’s ability to service its debt includes more
than simply financial considerations,395 the supertrustee would be familiar
with the general state of the sovereign and would be able to warn
bondholders if a proposed restructuring was unwarranted.
Finally, the supertrustee’s monitoring function would address the issue of
a sovereign’s delay in calling a restructuring when it is necessary.396 The
supertrustee could use the information at its disposal to pressure a sovereign
to restructure its debt in a timely manner. This would help make
restructurings more efficient. It would also curb the moral hazard concerns
that arise from the IFI lending that often accompanies a restructuring. If
sovereigns restructured their debt in a timely manner, they could potentially
avoid IFI lending entirely.397 Moreover, lender moral hazard would be
decreased because there would be a supertrustee monitoring the bonds,
thereby eliminating some of the risk inherent in the investments.398
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In addition, the supertrustee could be given the authority to call for a
restructuring, provided a predetermined majority of bondholders vote in
favor of initiating the process. This would be in both the sovereign’s and
the bondholders’ interest because the faster a restructuring is concluded, the
less it will cost all parties involved. The supertrustee’s other proposed
powers will further assist in making restructurings efficient.
The supertrustee would also have the powers necessary to serve a
coordination function, due to its position as an agent of the bondholders.399
The supertrustee would be aware of and in contact with all the bondholders
at any given time, thereby eliminating much of the coordination confusion
inherent in the initial phases of restructurings.400 This would help cut
sovereigns’ agency costs and reduce the need for financial advisors to assist
in a restructuring.401 Improved coordination could help shorten the total
duration of restructurings by decreasing the time typically devoted to the
initial preparation.402
Once a restructuring is initiated, the supertrustee would be able to serve a
negotiating function.403 The supertrustee will be in a unique position to
evaluate the merits of a proposed restructuring, due to its past monitoring
and substantial knowledge about the sovereign.404 The supertrustee’s
approval of a proposed restructuring should ease bondholder concerns that
the sovereign is restructuring opportunistically.405 Moreover, having the
supertrustee negotiate on their behalf will eliminate the need for
bondholders to form creditor groups to strengthen their negotiating
power.406 The presence of a well-informed negotiator, acting on behalf of
all bondholders, should make restructurings significantly more efficient and
faster to conduct.407
The sovereign bond supertrustee that this Note proposes differs from
Amihud, Garbade, and Kahan’s corporate bond supertrustee in that the
sovereign bond supertrustee would apply its monitoring, coordinating, and
negotiating powers across multiple bond issues.408 This would result in a
form of aggregation, as the supertrustee’s actions would be binding on all
prior bond issues.409 The use of the supertrustee, paired with CACs and a
degree of aggregation across all bond issues, would protect sovereigns from
the threat of vulture funds.410 To the extent that sovereigns have bonds
with UACs in the market, the supertrustee clause would give the sovereign
399. See supra notes 243–45 and accompanying text.
400. See supra notes 123, 223–25 and accompanying text.
401. See supra notes 121–23 and accompanying text.
402. See supra Part II.B.
403. See supra notes 253–55 and accompanying text.
404. See supra notes 254–55 and accompanying text.
405. See supra notes 100–10 and accompanying text.
406. See, e.g., supra note 294 and accompanying text.
407. See supra Part II.B.
408. See Amihud, Garbade & Kahan, supra note 237, at 470 (stating the supertrustee
would monitor compliance with the bond indenture, not all of the company’s issued bonds’
indentures).
409. See supra notes 260–76 and accompanying text.
410. See supra notes 145–58 and accompanying text; see also supra Part II.C.
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a means of restructuring the bond free from the subsequent holdout
battles.411
The supertrustee would negotiate the restructurings on behalf of all
bondholders, who would then vote on whether to accept the terms.
Bondholders would be unable to holdout from the restructuring because it
would be binding on everyone once the predetermined majority of
bondholders voted in favor of the restructuring. This proposed structure
would essentially combine the use of a supertrustee with the current
function of CACs. The supertrustee would be unable to bind bondholders
to the negotiated bonds unless a sufficient majority of bondholders
The proposed aggregation effect that the
approved the terms.412
supertrustee would have on sovereign bonds embodies one of the purported
benefits of the envisioned SDRM.413
The proposed supertrustee contractual mechanism follows the trend of
contractual evolution in the sovereign bond market.414 CACs were
promoted as a contractual, market-based solution to restructuring
problems.415 Similarly, the proposed supertrustee clause would result in a
contractual, market-based response to the remaining problems with
sovereign restructurings. The supertrustee clause could be adopted
organically—the way CACs were adopted—and gradually become a
standard component of bond contracts.416
It is reasonable to expect the supertrustee clause will have an effect on
bond prices.417 However, creditors would probably attach positive value to
the clause because the presence of a supertrustee would decrease the
likelihood of default, as well as the negative consequences of a
restructuring. In addition, the supertrustee clause may only be needed for
bonds issued by sovereigns perceived to be at a high risk of default.418
These risky bonds are typically sold at a reduced price on the secondary
market due to the uncertainty of recovering on the investment.419 If a
supertrustee alleviates that concern, the prices should increase to reflect a
value closer to the face value420 of the bond.421
One weakness of the proposed supertrustee clause is that it has not been
adopted in the corporate context. However, this is not dispositive in the
sovereign bond context because there have been a series of reform efforts in
the international community, evidencing an interest in contractual
adaptation.422 Moreover, corporate bonds are subject to state bankruptcy
411.
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laws, so there is less of a need for contractual reform to stabilize corporate
bankruptcies.423 The supertrustee clause could effect meaningful change to
the restructuring process, thereby providing the sovereign bond markets
with greater stability and predictability.
If Argentina had utilized the supertrustee clause proposed in this Note, it
could have avoided much of the trouble it finds itself in today.424 A
supertrustee would have been monitoring Argentina throughout its financial
problems in the late 1990s and leading up to its 2001 default.425 The
supertrustee would have been able to warn bondholders that a restructuring
was imminent, and it would have been able to advise them on the merits of
Argentina’s proposed exchange. In addition, bondholders would not have
needed the GCAB because the coordination efforts would have already
been improved by the supertrustee.426 This probably would have resulted in
a restructuring more closely resembling the 2001 default and had a greater
bondholder participation rate.427 Moreover, Argentina might not have
needed the IMF’s USD 12.5 billion credit package if it had conducted its
restructuring prior to or immediately after the 2001 default.428
In addition, bondholders who attempted to hold out from the
supertrustee-led restructuring would have been bound to the agreement, due
to the aggregation power inherent in the supertrustee structure.429 This
would have eliminated the need for a second exchange.430 It also would
have negated Elliott Associates’ and other vulture funds’ ability to sue
Argentina for the full value of the defaulted bonds.431 Argentina would not
have defaulted entirely and would not be paying other bondholders in
violation of the pari passu clause.432 Rather, all bondholders would receive
the same haircut433 and be paid equally, according to the restructuring
negotiated by the supertrustee and voted on by a majority of
bondholders.434
CONCLUSION
Sovereign bonds play a vital role in the international community. They
provide sovereigns with much needed capital and have proved to be a
profitable investment for creditors.435 Unfortunately, not all sovereigns are
able to meet all of their debt obligations.436 Without an international

423.
424.
425.
426.
427.
428.
429.
430.
431.
432.
433.
434.
435.
436.

See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 1–9, 185–220 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 280–88 and accompanying text.
See supra note 294 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 304–05 and accompanying text.
See supra note 288 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 408–12 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 310–13 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 1–9, 280–333 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 177–82, 320–22 and accompanying text.
See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 399–407, 412 and accompanying text.
See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
See supra note 278 and accompanying text.

936

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82

bankruptcy court, sovereign debtors and their creditors must rely on the
terms of the bond contracts to guide the bond restructuring process.437 The
current contractual mechanism utilized, the CAC, has proved
insufficient.438
This Note proposed the implementation of a contractual clause that
would create a supertrustee role in the sovereign bond context.439 This
supertrustee would monitor the issuing sovereign’s finances,440 coordinate
bondholders in the event of default,441 and negotiate the terms of the
restructuring on behalf of the bondholders.442 The use of a supertrustee
would help make restructurings more efficient,443 eliminate the risk of
opportunistic default,444 and curb the holdout problem that has enabled
vulture funds to profit off sovereign financial crises.445 An improved
restructuring process is in the interest of bondholders and creditors alike, as
it would help maximize the flow of capital in both directions.
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